Dawson on Understanding Cognitive Sience |
Unlike most overviews of Cognitive Science, Michael Dawson's gives, in his words, "the big picture" rather than organizing it in terms of various approaches to the issues. His text, Understanding Cognitive Science, is structured around the computational / connectionist controversy.
ABSTRACT The central thesis of Dawson's book is that the computational and connectionist models of the mind can be reconciled. Cognitive science research issues are marked by shared terminology which, in principle, can be shared by communication researchers. The disciplines Dawson includes and excludes are determined by his cetnral thesis. The reconciliation Dawson envisions reveals a strong adherence to the computational model of the mind. The computational / connectionist controversy structures Dawson's work. The future research directions he anticipates are the product of the reconciliation of the two models. Dawson is uncritically committed to the notion of disciplinary paradigms which underlies his view of the reconciliation of the two points of view—they must be reconciled. He does not entertain the possibility that conflicting views can provide a tenison that is heuristic. |
cognitive science research areas related to communication
Dawson argues that “The community served by Cognitive Science is held together by a common language” (3). However, its terminiology is in the process of being negotiated. Dawson writes:
One of the main themes of this book is to describe a framework for the "language" of cognitive science, and to demonstrate how this framework makes interdisciplinary conversation possible. (7)
This opens the door to communication studies which shares many of the concepts employed in CS.
modularity of the mind
Dawson supports Fodor's theory of modularity, arguing that it shows that "evidence from neuroscience can also play a great role in supporting functional analysis," an important level of analysis in classical computational theories of the mind (208). (See Dawson's delineation of functional analysis, 160ff.)
disciplines included and excluded
Dawson's book is organized around the computational/connectionist views of the mind. He does not take up specific fields and their contributions to CS. In doing so, he refers to the usual inter-displines associated with CS—pyschology, atificial intelligence, computer science, linguistics, information science, neuroscience, philosophy. He does not mention anthropology or comunication studies.
methods included and excluded
Given the focus of Dawson's book on competing models, the methods about which he is most concerned are computational analysis, functional analysis, algorithmic analysis, and implementational analysis. Consequently, there is no mention of methods that are used in communication studies, e.g., content analysis
adherence to the computational model of the mind
Since Dawson thesis is that the computational and connectionist views of the mind can be reconciled without abandoning the computational aspects of CS, his adherence is quite strong. His view is similar to Thagard's view that computation will remain a standard in CS but that it has to be expanded. (See Thagard on Mind). An important dimesnion of Dawson's argument is a functionalist architecture of mind.
the computational / connectionist controversy
As already mentioned, Understanding Cognitive Science is centered in the computational / connectionist controversy. His view is that the competing models can be reconciled (292-298).
Dawson describes the book as looking for the big picture with the lens of David Marr's tri-level hypothesis (12). It asks three questions:
1. what problem is being solved?
2. what steps are being taken to solve it.?
3. how are these steps carried out by a physical device?
So, the first level identifies the goal motivating the thinking. The second looks at the process of thinking. And the third looks at the physiological conditions required for the task.
In his last chapter, "The Tri-Level Hypothesis and Cognitive Science," Dawson concludes:
Connectionism has been championed as being a paradigm shift away from classical cognitive science (e.g., Schneider, 1987). While ther certainly are potential (and interesting) differences between these two approaches, it is not clear that a compelling argument can be made that such a paradigm shift has occurred. This chapter has shown that when using the tri-level hypothesis to focus our comparison of these two approaches, we find many similarities between them. Indeed, the fat that the two can be compared in this way at all indicates a commitment to a common paradigm—an endorsement of the foundational sssumption of cognitive science: cognition is information processing. (297-298)
Dawson takes a “big picture” view rather than the “approaches view” that characterizes other overviews of CS. He focuses on the questions shared, rather than the divergent answers to them (10). This aspect of his argument is very compelling. However, his conclusion (see "looking ahead" above) is based on the notion that a discipline has a unified "paradigm." This assumption is questionable. (See The Field of Communication as a Cognitive Map of a Domain.)
Dawson is uncritically committed to the notion of disciplinary paradigms which underlies his view of the reconciliation of the two points of view—they must be reconciled. He does not entertain the possibility that conflicting views can provide a tenison that functions as a research heuristic.
Dawson's view of linguists' contribution to CS centers in Chomsky's theory of language. As a result, he does not consider the work of cognitive linguists who hold a view of language that conflicts with Chomsky's.
The opposition between cognitive linguists and Chomskyans is as agonistic as the one between computationalists and connectionists. Moreover, the notion that cognitive linguists can or should share terminology with Chomskyans is not feasible since their terminologies are based on radically different sets of assumptions. (See Cognitive Science as Interdisciplinary.)
jjs
Notes:
. Dawson does refer to Lakoff's writings on categorization but not to Langacker or Fauconnier nor to Fillmore or Tannen. Langacker's Foundations of Cognitive Grammar was published in 1987, the same year as Lakoff's Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things to which he does refer, abeit in passing| ... 
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last revised:
September 13, 2007
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